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ABSTRACT
Anti-money laundering (AML) broadly encompasses procedures, processes, 
laws, or regulations designed to curtail the practice of generating funds 
through illicit or criminal activities. Since 2001, Malaysian law enforcement 
agencies have stepped up their capacities and efforts to curb money 
laundering. However, implementation costs incurred on AML activities 
could be burdensome to the regulating, enforcement, and reporting agencies. 
Although these efforts are generally benefi cial, assessing their effectiveness 
before increasing the level of AML regulation is necessary. This paper 
reviews literature on various approaches used to estimate money laundering 
and assess the effectiveness of AML. Although different measures and 
models are used to estimate money laundering, no model to quantify money 
laundering is globally acceptable. The absence of an accurate measurement 
of costs incurred and the diffi culty in linking benefi ts to AML efforts pose 
challenges in assessing the effectiveness of AML policy. Nevertheless, the use 
of both crime data and perceived data on cost and effectiveness serves as a 
step forward in the determination of the effectiveness of AML in Malaysia. 
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Introduction
Money laundering converts dirty money into clean funds by using various 
methods. Dirty money is derived through illegal or illicit means, such as 
high ranking executives in large corporations diverting money to personal 
accounts, tax evasion, prostitution, or drug traffi cking. Money is commonly 
laundered via fi nancial institutions (e.g., insurance companies, banks, etc.) 
or by setting up businesses and companies serving as fronts for receiving 
the illicit funds. In many cases, these businesses are transacted in cash only, 
allowing the owners to avoid any paper trail. 
Anti-money laundering (AML) broadly encompasses procedures, processes, 
laws, or regulations designed to curtail the practice of generating funds 
through illicit or criminal activities. Since 2001, the government of Malaysia 
has undertaken numerous measures to combat money laundering, one of 
which was the enactment of the Anti-Money Laundering Act (AMLA), 
which came into effect on January 15, 2002. In addition, the Minister of 
Finance appointed the central bank of Malaysia, Bank Negara Malaysian 
(BNM), as a competent authority under the AMLA. BNM established a 
new department, the Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU), in 2001 to carry out 
its mandated role and functions set out in the AMLA. According to Harun 
(2004), AMLA provides a framework on how FIU works with regulatory 
and supervisory bodies, reporting institutions, and law enforcement agencies 
to ensure that the AMLA is implemented well throughout an organization. 
The relationships between these agencies are shown in Figure 1 (Harun, 
2004).  All these departments or agencies set up their own taskforces to 
combat money laundering. 
As a member of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), 
Malaysia has taken measures to enhance the skills and knowledge of 
personnel involved in combating money laundering and terrorism fi nancing 
at both national and regional levels. The government has also rolled out a 
three-year National Anti-Money Laundering/Counter Terrorism Financing 
Strategic Plan from 2010 to 2012 (The Star, 20 July 2010). Various training 
workshops are organised or co-organised by BNM and the Southeast Asia 
Regional Centre for Counter-Terrorism. In addition, dialogues and awareness 
programs on AML are also being carried out by reporting institutions. These 
workshops and programs provide platforms for interactions to increase 
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commitment, compliance, and cooperation among reporting institutions that 
play critical roles in the implementation of AML, and for countermeasures 
on terrorism fi nancing (Bank Negara Malaysia, 2005). AMLA also requires 
all reporting institutions to create ongoing employee training programs to 
guard against and recognise any suspicious transactions.
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Figure 1:  AMLA Framework (source: Harun, 2004)
Enforcement agencies, such as Royal Malaysian Customs (RMC), Anti-
Corruption Agencies, Royal Malaysian Police, and BNM, are involved in 
enforcing the AMLA. Specifi cally, the RMC has set up the Trade Crimes and 
Money Laundering Unit to counter money laundering in the country. The 
Malaysian Anti-Corruption Commission and the RMC have also established 
dedicated AML/CFT units to focus on money laundering and terrorism 
financing investigations (The Malaysian Insider, 2010). Besides the 
enforcement agencies, the Securities Commission has also issued guidelines 
to reporting institutions, such as dealers, fund managers, and futures brokers, 
for the prevention of money laundering and terrorism fi nancing since 2004. 
These reporting institutions are required to implement the key elements of 
the AMLA framework to guard against money laundering and to ensure 
compliance with the relevant requirements of the AMLA (Accountants 
Today, 2004). 
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Since 2001, the Malaysian government and its enforcement agencies have 
stepped up their capacities and efforts to curb money laundering. These 
efforts help prevent terrorism and smuggling activities, as well as help 
improve parity and competitiveness in the market, providing the nation with 
stable and consistent economic growth. Although these efforts are generally 
benefi cial, assessing their effectiveness before increasing the level of AML 
regulation is necessary. However, assessing the effectiveness of AML is 
rather challenging, as obtaining a reliable measure for the implementation 
costs of AML is diffi cult. Moreover, the benefi ts of these efforts are often 
not apparent and direct. The lack of information on criminal data is also 
deterrent to measuring money laundering effectively. 
This paper reviews previous studies on the different approaches used to 
estimate money laundering/money laundered and assess the effectiveness 
of AML. 
Money Laundering
At its core, money laundering is simply the effort to conceal the origins of 
illegally derived funds that have been converted for legitimate aims. The 
U.S. General Accounting Offi ce defi nes money laundering as the act of 
converting money gained from illegal activity, such as drug smuggling, 
into money that appears legitimate whilst the source cannot be traced to 
the illegal activity. The tragic bombing of the World Trade Center in New 
York on September 11, 2001 triggered a global push to associate money 
laundering with the fi nancing of terrorism. Henceforth, AML/CFT represents 
a concerted global initiative to rein money laundering and terrorism 
financing. However, contrary to the definition of money laundering, 
terrorism fi nancing reverses the defi nition, as it typically involves money 
derived from legal pursuits that is converted into forms that enable acts of 
violence for political purposes.
Currently, estimating how much money is actually laundered in any other 
country or globally is virtually impossible. A sustained effort by the United 
States Financial Action Task Force (FATF) between 1996 and 2000 failed to 
produce any such estimates. In fact, no direct estimates of how much money 
goes through the fi nancial system for the purpose of converting illegally 
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sourced funds into non-traceable forms exists. Conversely, fi nancial fi rms 
are not affi rmatively motivated nor do they possess tools to estimate the 
extent of laundering in their accounts.  Thus, the production of any such 
fi gure will ever be unlikely. However, advances in technology might help 
fi nancial institutions in this aspect;  but even this is debatable.
In its crusade against money laundering, the FATF became the main 
international body, through peer pressure and the threat of blacklisting, 
to get 180 jurisdictions to sign up to its standards, instead of establishing 
formal legal or treaty powers. Overall, FATF has achieved signifi cant 
gains in getting countries to pass AML and customer due diligence 
(CDD) laws. FATF acknowledges that unless a concurrent effort to ensure 
effective implementation of these laws by governments, supervisors, 
law enforcement, and fi nancial institutions exists, then the progress will 
be lethargic. A concern is the disconnect culminating from ineffective 
implementation of AML laws perpetrated by fi nancial institutions that 
demonstrate poor AML responsibilities by choosing to override the laws 
driven by profi t motives. To compound matters, the FATF noted that most 
countries get trapped in mountains of paperwork and bureaucracy in dealing 
with the subject and yet fell short of providing fi nancial institutions with 
clear assessment guidelines on risks and effective AML follow-up action 
plans (Global Witness, 2012).
According to Shanmugam et al. (2003), little data is readily available on the 
volume and value of money laundering activities. Reuter and Truman (2005) 
observed that systematic estimates for the scale of money laundering do not 
exist. The illegal nature of money laundering makes accurately measuring 
the amount of money laundered every year diffi cult (Alkaabi et al., 2010). 
Past studies have attempted to measure the magnitude of money laundering 
(Akaabi et al., 2010; Masciandora & Barone, 2008; Schneider, 2010b). 
Attempts to estimate global money laundering has thus far showed large 
variations in the magnitude of laundered funds. According to Walker (1999), 
quantitative measures of money laundering provide a baseline and a scale 
for measurement, enabling AML programs to be reviewed. The International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) (1998) estimated the aggregate size of global money 
laundering to be somewhere between 2% and 5% of the world’s gross 
domestic product (GDP), which is between USD 640 billion and USD 1.6 
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trillion. In more recent years, Masciandro and Barone (2008) estimated that 
the value of money laundering is equal to USD 1.2 trillion (2.7% of world 
GDP). A United Nations Offi ce on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) report 
estimated that in 2009, criminal proceeds amounted to 3.6% of global GDP, 
with 2.7% (or USD 1.6 trillion) being laundered.
Money laundering is sometimes examined from the effects of organized 
crime. As suggested by Reuter and Truman (2005), the success of the AML 
system could be judged not just by how much it reduces money laundering, 
but by how much it reduces the criminal activities that generate laundering, 
namely drug trafficking, corruption, and terrorism. An investigation 
conducted in Germany revealed that the total amount of damages caused 
by organized crime in 2004 reached EUR 759 million, with estimated 
profi ts amounting to EUR 1,337 million (Schneider, 2010a). However, 
provisionally seized assets only added up to a total value of EUR 68 million. 
Schneider (2010b) estimated the turnover of organised crime and money 
laundering for Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) countries from 1995 to 2006, and found that the volume of turnover 
from organised crime in these countries was USD 270 billion in 1995 and 
USD 614 billion in 2006. 
Geiger and Wuensch (2007) identifi ed two types of indirect costs or damages 
due to AML requirements, namely, societal and economic damages. The 
damages on society comprise loss of civil liberties, especially privacy. The 
AML provisions are a threat to the privacy of the individual. In terms of 
the economic perspective, AML requirements increase the direct cost of 
legitimate and illegitimate market transactions. As a result, the market loses 
its competitive power. A question then arises as to who should pay for these 
prevention measures and how effective these measures are.
The international community considers the fi ght against money laundering 
and terrorist fi nancing a top priority. Particularly, the IMF is alarmed about 
the possible impacts of money laundering, terrorist fi nancing, and related 
governance issues on fi nancial and economic integrity and stability. These 
activities undermine the integrity and stability of fi nancial institutions and 
systems, discourage foreign investment, and distort international capital 
fl ows. They may negatively affect a country’s fi nancial stability and 
macroeconomic performance, resulting in welfare losses, draining resources 
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from more productive economic activities, and even have destabilizing 
spillover effects on the economies of countries. In an increasingly 
interconnected world, the negative effects of these activities are global, and 
their impact on the fi nancial integrity and stability of countries is widely 
recognized. To this effect, the Deputy Managing Director of IMF, Min Zhu, 
reiterated effective AML and combating the fi nancing of terrorism regimes 
as essential to protect the integrity of markets and of the global fi nancial 
framework, as they help mitigate the factors that facilitate fi nancial abuse, 
and characterizing actions to prevent and combat money laundering and 
the fi nancing of terrorism as not only akin to a moral imperative, but also 
to an economic need (International Monetary Fund, 2013).
Money Laundering Models
Various models have been developed to quantify the size of money 
laundering. John Walker’s (1999; 2004; 2007) model, or the Walker model, 
estimates money laundering based on a simple economic crime model 
with the use of international databases. The model estimates the size and 
development of money laundering using an international input-output model 
based on standard economic theory. The amount of money laundered is 
based on the probability of those proceeds being laundered. He estimated 
the extent of various different types of crimes and the proceeds resulting 
from these crimes. Walker (2007) concluded that global money laundering 
accounted for as much as USD 3 trillion per annum.  In his model, Walker 
fi rst scrutinized money generated for laundering per country, and then 
examined the fl ows of generated money from one country to another. 
He stated that money could be laundered in the country in which it was 
generated or sent to another country for laundering. As soon as money 
has traveled (fl owed) at least once, it is “white washed”, or laundered. 
Only this fi rst transaction involving the placement of funds is counted in 
the model. Although “hot money” can be moved on multiple occasions in 
efforts to disguise its criminal origins, this model does not count each of 
these transactions or the movement of funds. Hence, the actual gross fl ows 
of money laundering could be much higher.
Schneider and Windischbauer (2006) and Masciandaro and Barone (2008) 
found the results produced by Walker to be scientifi cally doubtful because 
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they are not reproducible and proven. Peter Reuter (2007) was also skeptical 
about estimating money laundering and organized crimes using the Walker 
model. He found neither the national nor the global estimates for money 
laundered to be rather vague. Reuter (2007) stated that the vagueness of 
such estimates is a result of both disagreements over how to conceptualise 
money laundering, as well as the weaknesses in the techniques employed 
to quantify it. Consequently, estimates in the volume of money laundering 
are subject to variation, and hence, may not be an appropriate measure 
to judge the effectiveness of AML. He also found that the estimates of 
money laundering in the ‘underground economy’ were weak because little 
was known about what share of proceeds, either legitimate or illegitimate, 
was processed in ways that were designed to conceal the origins (Reuter, 
2007:11). Moreover, it assumed that all countries attract criminal money 
for the same reasons and different economic structures are ignored (Unger 
et al., 2006).
Although Reuter was very skeptical of the estimates of money laundering 
developed by Walker, Unger et al. (2006) defended the Walker model. 
Unger et al. (2006) stated that the Walker model establishes a framework 
to measure money laundering nationally and globally. Furthermore, she 
argued that the Walker model is a positive model for interdisciplinary work 
of criminology and economics. Unger et al. (2006) applied the gravity 
approach to the Walker model and estimated money laundering and its 
effects in the Netherlands. More recently, Ferwerda et al. (2013) tested the 
models of Walker and Unger to predict illicit money laundering fl ows with 
the focus on trade-based money laundering. Trade-based money laundering 
is referred to as ‘criminal proceeds that are transferred around the world 
using fake invoices that under- or overvalue imports and exports’ (Ferweda 
et al., 2013: 3170). Ferwerda et al. (2013) replaced the functional form of 
the Walker model, which is a mix of linear and multiplicative variables, 
by a multiplicative traditional gravity equation as frequently used for 
trade fl ows, and extended this model with explanatory variables from the 
Walker and Unger models. They found that the equation was able to explain 
satisfactorily the distribution of trade-based money laundering between 199 
countries and the U.S. Their results suggest that countries with strict AML 
regulation experience more trade related money laundering.
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Even though various models have been developed to estimate and measure 
money laundering, a globally accepted model to quantify money laundering 
in a given fi nancial system does not exist (Norwen, 2008). According to 
Reuter (2007), the lack of a systematic approach in capturing the scale of 
each crime results in the failure in capturing the estimates of total earnings 
from each major class of illegal crime activity. In addition, Duyne (2003) 
claimed that no proper knowledge of the nature and extent of the size and 
development of money laundering or organized crime exists globally. He 
further added that although money laundering and organized crime have 
been portrayed as a global movement, none has thought of it, in a manner of 
speaking, as a multi-country integrated strategic information management 
system. The inherent lack of knowledge about money laundering is matched 
by a lack of unity and transparency. Hence, this awareness has not been 
translated into any further actions to counter money laundering.
Effectiveness of Anti-money Laundering 
Implementing AML requirements comes with signifi cant costs. At times, 
the process of implementation can be extensive and rather costly. Besides, 
fi nancial criminals are continuously looking for new ways to launder their 
money. Offenders will take advantage of every situation to launder even 
with the implementation of AML requirements. The assessment of the 
effectiveness of AML requirements is thus diffi cult, because regulating, 
enforcement, and reporting agencies need to constantly update, review, and 
improve its implementation to effectively curb money laundering nationally 
or globally. 
According to Tang et al. (2010), assessing the effectiveness of AML policies 
is a controversial issue. Finding a reliable fi gure regarding costs and benefi ts 
of implementing AML requirements is practically impossible. Generally, an 
AML system can be considered effective if its benefi ts outweigh the costs 
incurred in fi ghting money laundering and terrorism fi nancing. Carrington 
and Shams (2006) stated that no clear formula to assess whether an AML/
CFT system has been effective in achieving its objectives exists. The 
question of effectiveness is elusive when a reliable method to measure the 
amount of money being laundered or the amount of terrorist funds being 
circulated does not exist. Hence, assessing the effectiveness of an AML 
system, particularly in assessing the impact of AML, is a challenging task. 
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Nevertheless, attempts have been made by researchers examining the 
effectiveness of an AML system from various aspects. Biagoli (2008) 
highlighted a few approaches to measure the cost-effectiveness of AML. 
An approach is to employ the ‘opportunity cost theory.’ According to 
Biagoli (2008), one should invest in a given action as long as the benefi ts 
derived from such an investment remain higher than the benefi ts that could 
be harvested from investing in an alternative fi eld or activity. The benefi ts 
deriving from devoting resources to AML should be greater than those 
coming from other alternative activities. Another approach suggested by 
Biagoli (2008) is to achieve a ‘break-even point’ (costs equal benefi ts) in a 
situation where crimes are reduced below a so-called ‘serious social alarm 
threshold’ (Biagoli, 2008). Accordingly, Masciandaro and Barone (2008) 
estimated the benefi ts and costs from designing an effective AML regime, 
providing a conservative estimation of the economic value of money 
laundering globally from the point of view of criminal organizations.
Unger and Rawlings (2005) carried out work on the effects of money 
laundering to distinguish between direct and indirect effects of crime and 
between short-term and long-term effects of money laundering. Their 
study examined the effects of money laundering on 25 different qualitative 
classifi cations such as business activities, relative prices and consumptions, 
amongst others. Using various proxies, Chong and Lopez-de-Silanes 
(2006) developed systematic efforts to assess global money laundering 
volume by considering the impact of regulation and enforcement of money 
laundering. Their proxies for money laundering were indirectly measured 
and complemented with subjective indicators from opinion surveys. 
Unger et al. (2006) conducted a qualitative and quantitative assessment on 
the effect of money laundering in the Netherlands. They found that money 
laundering had a negative effect on the economic growth and fi nancial 
stability of the Netherlands. Similarly, Ferwerda (2008; 2009) developed a 
theoretical model and found AML policy to be negatively correlated with 
crime rate.  Based on the assumption of the rational behaviour of criminals, 
Ferwerda’s model of criminalization of money laundering examined three 
factors, namely, the probability of being caught for money laundering, the 
sentence for money laundering, and the probability of being convicted for 
the predicate crime and transaction costs of money laundering. According to 
Ferwerda (2008; 2009), if these factors are positively infl uenced by stricter 
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policy, AML policy such as the role of laws, the institutional framework, the 
duties of the private sector in law enforcement, and international cooperation 
can help deter potential criminals from illegal behaviour, and hence, reduce 
the crime rate. Employing a data set from the mutual evaluation reports on 
money laundering of the FATF, IMF, and World Bank, Ferwerda (2008; 
2009) found that AML policy, particularly international cooperation, is the 
most important policy area for reducing crime, suggesting that international 
organizations should work together to fi ght against money laundering.
In addition, past research examined the perceived effectiveness of AML 
requirements. A questionnaire study was conducted in the U.K. by 
Yeandle et al. (2005), and they found that only 24% of U.K. respondents 
and 54% of international respondents perceived AML as being ‘good’ or 
‘very good’ at deterring money laundering. In another study, Tang et al. 
(2010) examined the effectiveness of China’s AML policies on several 
aspects, namely effectiveness of AML legislation, effectiveness of AML 
regulation, monitoring and analysis, investigation, and judicial litigation. 
The questionnaire was prepared according to the FATF 40 recommendations 
and FATF 9 special recommendations. Tang et al. (2010) found that 59% 
of the respondents think that China’s overall AML requirements is ‘totally 
effective’ and that 36% of the respondents think that it is ‘basically effective,’ 
with only 5% calling it ‘ineffective.’ Their fi ndings are inconsistent with 
prior research conducted by Cuellar (2003), who found that the American 
AML system failed to reach the targets stipulated by the law and expected 
by regulatory authorities. Similarly, Geiger and Wuensch (2007) stated 
that most professionals and researchers believe that AML measures are 
not very effective in preventing upstream crimes, such as drug traffi cking, 
terrorism, and corruption.
PricewaterhouseCoopers (2007) conducted a survey on the cost benefi ts of 
the AML risk-based approach. The majority of the respondents (91%) said 
they were ‘very satisfi ed’ or ‘satisfi ed’ their organization had successfully 
implemented the risk-based approach to AML requirements.  However, their 
responses on its cost benefi ts are not clear. A total of 82% of the respondents 
indicated that they had not noticed any benefi ts of implementing a risk-based 
approach, with 6% stating that negative effects on costs were observed. A 
total of 64% the respondents who had not identifi ed any cost benefi ts to 
date never expected to see any benefi ts from the AML system. 
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Conclusion
Implementation costs incurred on AML activities could be burdensome to 
the regulating, enforcement, and reporting agencies. Clearly, however, the 
focus should be directed on achieving positive outcomes instead of cost 
rationalization. Tackling the risk of human error is a concern. According to 
Reddington (2011), merely complying with the FATF’s recommendations 
may not be suffi cient to create an effective AML regime. Yeandle et al. 
(2005) advised that, in increasing the level of regulation further, assessing 
the effectiveness of current AML requirements is important.  Reuter and 
Truman (2005) stated that in an era where performance assessment is a 
routine demand imposed on government agencies around the world, a careful 
assessment of the achievements of the existing AML regime is required. 
Accordingly, Shanmugam et al. (2003) recommended that conducting an 
internal audit to evaluate the effectiveness of money laundering awareness 
programs and compliance among the staff of fi nancial institutions may be 
necessary. On a negative note, in the current environment of cost control, 
centring on preserving capital and prioritizing investment of precious 
resources on frontline business development, calls for a greater focus on 
AML may not present an enticing proposition. 
This paper examined the effectiveness of AML from three perspectives, 
namely, cost effectiveness, perceived effectiveness, and effectiveness on 
meeting AML objectives. Various measures have been used to estimate money 
laundering/laundered. However, the absence of an accurate measurement of 
AML costs makes demonstrating whether AML requirements are effective 
challenging (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2007).  This argument is supported 
by Ferwerda et al. (2013), who stated that an evaluation of the effects of 
AML policies is hampered by an enormous lack of data. Before venturing 
into measuring the benefi ts of AML, more reliable measures to assess 
the implementation costs of AML activities should be established. As 
information on criminal data is currently lacking, estimates, such as the use 
of perceived costs, may be considered and used to assess the effectiveness 
of AML. This approach, using both crime data and perceived data, will 
then allow an analysis on the effectiveness or cost-effectiveness of AML. 
The approach can serve as a step forward in determining the effectiveness 
of AML in Malaysia. 
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